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The Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) is a National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) Headquarters Safety Division, Code QS produced document
that is prepared for use by the NASA Associate Administrator, Office of
Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA) and the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS) Program Manager prior to each NSTS
flight. The intent of the MSE is to document significant safety risk factors
that represent a change, or potential change, to the risk baselined by the
Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB) in the NSTS Hazard Reports. It also
documents unresolved safety risk factors impacting the STS-29 flight.
The MSE is published on a mission-by-mission basis for use in the Flight
Readiness Review (FRR) and is updated for the Launch Minus 2 Day (L-2) Review.
For tracking and archival purposes, the MSE is issued in final postflight
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The Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE)provides the Associate Administrator,
Office of Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA)
and the National Space Transportation System (NSTS)Program Managerwith the
NASAHeadquarters Safety Division position on significant changes, or
potential changes, to the Program safety risk baseline approved in the formal
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL)and Hazard
Analysis process. While somechanges to the baseline since the previous
flight are included to highlight their significance in risk level change, the
primary purpose is to ensure that changes which were too late to include in
formal changes through the FMEA/CILand Hazard Analysis process are documented
along with the safety position, which includes the acceptance rationale.
1.2 Scope
This report addresses STS-29safety risk factors that represent a
significant change from previous flights, factors from previous flights that
have impact on this flight, and factors that are unique to this flight.
Factors listed in the MSEare essentially limited to items that
significantly (or have the potential to) affect NSTSsafety risk factors and
have been elevated to Level I for discussion or approval. These changes are
derived from a variety of sources such as issues, concerns, problems, and
anomalies. It is not the intent to attempt to scour lower level files for
items dispositioned and closed at those levels and report them here; it is
assumedthat their significance is such that Level I discussion or approval is
not appropriate for them. Items against which there is clearly no safety
impact or potential concern will not be reported here, although items that
were evaluated at some length and found not to be a concern will be reported
as such. NASASafety Reporting System (NSRS)issues are considered along with
the other factors, but maynot be specifically identified as such.
Data gathering is a continuous process. However, collating and focusing
of MSEdata for a specific mission begins prior to the mission Launch Site
Flow Review (LSFR) and continues through the flight and return of the Orbiter
to Kennedy Space Center (KSC). For archival purposes, the MSEwill be updated
subsequent to the mission to add items identified too late for inclusion in
the prelaunch report and to documentperformance of the anomalous systems for
possible future use in safety evaluations.
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1.3 Organization
The MSEis presented in seven sections as follows:
Section i - Provides brief introductory remarks, including purpose,
scope, and organization.
Section 2 - Provides a summarydescription of the STS-29mission; a
brief flight/vehicle description, including launch data,
crew size, flight duration, launch and landing sites,
and other related information; and a brief payload
description.
Section 3 - Contains a summarylisting of significant safety risk
factors/issues, considered resolved or not a safety
concern prior to STS-29launch, that were impacted or
repeated by anomalies reported for the STS-29 flight.
Section 4 - Contains a summarylisting of significant safety risk
factors that are considered resolved for STS-29.
Section 5 - Contains a summarylisting of significant safety-of-
flight problems that developed during the STS-27
mission.
Section 6 Contains a summary listing of significant safety-of-
flight problems that developed during the STS-26
mission.
Section 7 Contains background and historical data on the issues,
problems, concerns, and anomalies addressed in Sections
3 through 6. This section is not normally provided as
part of the MSE, but is available upon request. It
contains (in notebook format) presentation data, white
papers, and other documentation. These data were used
to support the resolution rationale or retention of open
status for each item discussed in the MSE.
Appendix A - Contains the official STS-29 Inflight Anomaly (IFA)
Report. This report is included for completeness and
reference purposes. Those STS-29 IFAs which are
considered to represent significant safety risks will be
addressed in the MSE for the next NSTS flight.




2.1 Summary Description of STS-29 Mission
Space Shuttle Discovery was launched from Kennedy Space Center (KSC) at
9:57 A.M. EST on March 13, 1989. The primary objective of the STS-29 mission,
deployment of a Tracking and Data Relay Satellite/Inertial Upper Stage
<TDRS-D/IUS), was successfully accomplished. Six hours after liftoff, the
crew deployed the TDRS-D satellite from Discovery's payload bay. Discovery
was maneuvered to a safe position behind and above the TDRS-D/IUS, and the
first stage of the two-stage IUS motor was ignited to maneuver TDRS to the
desired attitude for subsequent boost into geosynchronous orbit. After a
successful flight of almost 5-days duration, Discovery landed at Edwards Air
Force Base at 9:35 A.M. EST on March 17, 1989.
The TDRS-D communications satellite is the third spacecraft deployed as
part of NASA's Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS). TDRS-D is
located at 41 degrees W. longitude, east of Brazil. It replaces TDRS-A,
deployed on STS-6 in April 1983, which has been moved to a parking orbit and
will be used only if a failure occurs on one of the remaining satellites.
Three TDRS satellites, operating from geosynchronous orbit, are required to
complete the constellation known as TDRSS. TDRSS increases communications
between Earth-orbiting spacecraft and a ground-based tracking station from 15
to 85 percent per orbit, and facilitates a much higher rate of data flow.
Secondary objectives of STS-29 were successfully accomplished, including
performance of attached cargo operations for the Orbiter Experiments
Autonomous Supporting Instrumentation System (OASIS-l) and Space Station Heat
Pipe Advanced Radiator Element (SHARE), and performance of a number of middeck
experiments. A complete list of payload bay and middeck experiments cargo is
contained in Section 2.3.
2-1
2.2 Flight/Vehicle Data
• Launch Date: March 13, 1989
• Launch Time: 9:57 A.M. EST
• Launch Site: KSC Pad 39B
• Landing Site: Edwards AFB, CA, Lakebed.
• RTLS: Kennedy Space Center, Runway 33
• TAL Site: Ben Guerir, Morocco
• AOA: Edwards AFB, CA
• Mission Duration: 4 Days, 23 Hours, 38 Minutes
• Crew Size: 5
• Inclination: 28.45 Degrees
• Altitude: 160 Nautical Miles/Direct Insertion
• Orbiter: OV-103 (8) Discovery
• SSMEs: 2022, 2028, 2031
• ET: ET-36
• SRBs: BI-031
• Total Cargo Weight: 44,792 Pounds
• Orbiter Weight, Including Cargo: 263,289 Pounds (at SRB Ignition)
• Total Vehicle Weight at SRB Ignition: 4,525,139 Pounds




- Tracking and Data Relay Satellite/Inertial Upper Stage
(TDRS-D/IUS)
- Orbiter Experiments AutonomousSupporting Instrumentation
System (OASIS-l)
- Space Station Heat Pipe AdvancedRadiator Element (SHARE)
- Shuttle Solar Backscatter Ultraviolet (SSBUV)
- GetawaySpecial (4)
Middeck
- Chromosomesand Plant Cells Division in Space Experiment
(CHROMEX)
- IMAXCameraSystem (Middeck)
- Polymer Morphology (PM) Experiment
- Protein Crystal Growth (PCG)
- Shuttle Student Involvement Project SE82-8 (Bone Healing
Experiment)
- Shuttle Student Involvement Project SE83-9 (Chicken Embryo
Development in Space)




SAFETY RISK FACTORS/ISSUES IMPACTED BY STS-29 ANOMALIES
This section contains a summary list of the significant safety risk
factors/issues, considered resolved or not a safety concern for STS-29 prior
to launch (see Sections 4, 5, and 6), that were impacted or repeated by
anomalies reported for the STS-29 flight. The list indicates the section of
this MSE in which the item is addressed, the item designation (Element/Number)
within that section, a description of the item, and brief comments concerning
the anomalous condition that was reported. (Anomalies that arose during the
STS-29 flight, that were not preflight safety risk factors/issues, can be




Section 4: Resolved Significant Safety Risk Factors
SSME i Gaseous Oxygen (GOX)
Flow Control Valves
(FCVs) can lock up due
to contamination.
Sluggish operation occurred again on
STS-29 during the first cycle. This
anomaly is being investigated,
although there was no mission
degradation and the FCVs cycled well
on all cycles subsequent to the
first. This risk factor will be
readdressed in the STS-30 MSE.
SSME 4 Nozzle coolant tube
protrusion into the flow





Although there was a liquid hydrogen
(1/{2) leak at the MCC/nozzle
interface due to braze failure,
there was no indication that coolant
tube protrusion was the cause.
There has been no report of
excessive temperature at the seal.
This risk factor will be readdressed
in the STS-30 MSE.
SRM I An incident during QM-8








The right aft field heater joint
failed during the STS-29 prelaunch
period. The secondary heater was
subsequently used and operated
satisfactorily. Twenty-ampere fast
acting circuit breakers will be
implemented to protect this circuit
for STS-30. Twenty-ampere instant
trip Ground Fault Interrupts (GFIs)





Bolt damage in aft-fwd
exit cone joint.
Extensive damage was experienced
again from STS-29 water impact.
This is not a safety issue because
the damaged parts are discarded.
But loss of hardware is a concern





This section contains a summarylisting of the significant safety risk
factors that were considered resolved for STS-29. These items were reviewed
by the NASAsafety community. A description and information regarding problem
resolution are provided for each safety risk factor. The safety position with
respect to resolution is based on findings resulting from System Safety Review
Panel (SSRP)and Program Control Review Board reviews (or other special panel
findings). It represents the safety assessment arrived at in accordance with
actions taken, efforts conducted, and tests/retests and inspections performed
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This section contains a supplementary list of significant inflight
anomalies arising from the STS-27 mission. Each anomaly is briefly described,
and risk acceptance information and rationale are provided. STS-27 inflight
anomalies still considered as significant unresolved safety risk factors for




































































































































































































































































































This section contains a summary listing of the STS-26 inflight
anomalies. Each anomaly is briefly described, and the resolution is
addressed. Among these items are STS-26 anomalies that were discussed and
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This section contains pertinent background information on the safety
risk factors and anomalies addressed in Sections 3 through 6. It is intended





This appendix contains the official listing of STS-29inflight anomalies
obtained directly from the NSTSProgram Compliance Assurance and Status System(PCASS)° Those anomalies which are considered to be significant safety risks
will be addressed in the MSEfor the next NSTSflight. However, for completeness
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AFT Frame Tilt Actuator
Air/Ground Voice System




















Dryden Flight Research Center






Environmental Control and Life Support Subsystem
Exhaust Gas Temperature
Eastern Standard Time



















































Failure Modes and Effects Analysis











Ground Space Flight Tracking and Data Network





High Pressure Fuel Turbopump
High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Hydraulic Power Unit
Hazard Report
































































Launch Systems Evaluation Advisory Team
Launch Site Flow Review
Launch Site Operations Center
Main Combustion Chamber; Mission Control Center (JSC)
Main Engine





Mission Operations Director; Modification
Main Propulsion System
Mission Safety Evaluation
Marshall Space Flight Center




NASA Safety Reporting System
National Space Transportation System
Nose Wheel Assembly
Orbiter Experiments Autonomous Supporting Instrumentation System
Operational Downlink/Downlist
Operations and Maintenance Instruction
Operations and Maintenance Requirements Specification























































LIST OF ACRONYMS (Continued)
Pressure









Program Requirements Control Board
Program Requirements Control Board Document
Pressure
Power Reactant Storage and Distribution
Pounds Per Square Inch
Pounds Per Square Inch Absolute
Pounds Per Square Inch Differential
Quick Disconnect
Repair and Replace






Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor
Range Safety System
Ready to Latch




Space Station Heat Pipe Advanced Radiator Element
Super Light Ablator





Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality Assurance
Stennis Space Center
Shuttle Solar Backscatter Ultraviolet
Space Shuttle Main Engine


















Tactical Air Command and Navigation System
Text and Graphics System
Transatlantic Abort Landing
Thermal Control System
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite






United Space Booster, Inc.
Volts Direct Current
Water Spray Boiler
B-5/(B-6 blank)

